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1. Economic Growth and Labour Markets in Europe
A fundamental point of this paper is, that - given existing structures (!) - the persistent problem of high
unemployment in Europe cannot be attributed to tendencies in "jobless-growth" but is mainly caused by the fact
that GDP-growth has been - and is still too low. This argument is first based on the pronounced cyclical
reagibility of employment and unemployment. A first glance at Figure 1 immediately reveals this cyclical
reagibility of European labour-markets - which is, however combined with "hysteresis-effects", thus creating a
tendency of increasing long-term unemployment. In the next section the question as to why growth-rates in the
80s and 90s were much lower than compared to the 60s
 and 70s will be studied. The connections between
employment and economic growth will be discussed in more detail in section 3 of this paper.
2. The Growth Perspective - the Central Role of Interest-Rates
Economic growth is, of course, the result of many factors. From a macroeconomic perspective the following
factors can be seen as relevant to the low economic growth of the last decade:
-  Exchange rate developments:
  The successful stabilisation of exchange rates from 1979 to 1992 was followed by a period of more or less
flexible exchange rates in Europe. Due to increased uncertainty for investors and corresponding high risk
premiums this resulted in substantial GDP-losses. According to estimates by the EU-Commission (1996) the
exchange rate turbulences in 1995 lowered EU-GDP by about 1/2 percentage point (Germany 1 percentage
point). Avoiding these exchange rate instabilities will create one of the major growth effects of EMU.
 
-  Overvaluation:
  For many European currencies, especially those of the DM-bloc, there was a substantial overvaluation
against the US-Dollar for a long period of the 80s and 90s. The reversal of this trend had an immediate
impact on European export performance. This has been the major single factor for higher European growth
rates in recent years.
-  Fiscal policy:
                                                       
* For their valuable help with the empirical data I am grateful to Markus Marterbauer and Martin Zagler.16
  The recession of 93 and the fiscal impact of high interest rates resulted in budgetary deficits that in many
European countries clearly were not sustainable. The provisions of the Maastricht Treaty thus only
underlined an already existing need for fiscal consolidation. The dampening effect on European aggregate
demand was however substantially increased by the simultaneous occurrence of restrictive fiscal policy in
practically all European countries and by the high speed of fiscal consolidation. In 1995 net-lending of the
public sector in EU-states was about 5% in average. Reaching the 3% goal meant - certeris paribus - a
dampening effect on GDP of about 3% to 4% in two years (M. Marterbauer, 1996, p.8).
 
  When considering macroeconomic relationships between economic growth and fiscal policy it is important
to pay special attention to flow-of-funds-effects - which unfortunately are often neglected in supply-side
oriented analyses. As will be later shown, a policy of high interest rates will lead to a decrease in
investment-rates and thus to a reduction in net-lending of the enterprise sector of an economy. Given stable
(or in some European economies even increasing) rates of private savings and constant (or due to
revaluation effects) declining external balances the lower net-lending of the enterprise sector
"automatically" has to be balanced by higher net-lending of the public sector. The higher net-lending of the
public sector thus essentially was - via automatic stabiliser effects - the effect and not the cause of the slow
growth of European GDP.
 
  Seen the other way round this means that a permanent and substantial fiscal consolidation in Europe will
only be possible if sufficiently high rates of economic growth will be achieved again over a longer period.
The American experience is a good illustration of this point.
 
  It may be argued that lower public deficits enable central banks - and the markets - to lower interest rates,
thus contributing to higher growth as well as helping with fiscal consolidation. The latter is obviously true.
Given an average public debt stock of 73,2% of GDP (EU-15, 1996) an interest rate reduction of two
percentage points results in lower public expenditures and lower net-lending by about 1% of GDP. The
basic assumption of a causality chain lower deficits - lower interest rates - higher growth is however
problematic from the point of view of flow-of-funds-analysis. If lower deficits ceteris paribus via lower
aggregate demand lead to lower growth this will eventually result in lower interest rates - but the path for
adjustment will be long and costly in terms of employment losses.
 
  These costs can only be avoided if the negative demand effects of the public sector are compensated by
positive effects in other sectors of the economy. This e.g. was the case in the Netherlands, where higher
economic growth was achieved via increased external balance surpluses, based on a devaluation of the real
(not the nominal) exchange rate, which in turn was achieved by substantially lower wage increases relative
to important foreign-trade partners (especially Germany)
1. It is obvious that this kind of strategy would
result in a "beggar-my-neighbour"-policy if it were followed by all EU-members. A growth-creating effect
for all EU-countries is only to be expected by an increase in foreign-trade balances vis-à-vis third countries.
                                                       
 
1 From 1987 (1992) to 1995 the Dutch current account surplus increased from HFL 6.4 bill (13,8) to 24.5 bill.
For total EU the current account deficit of 62.4 bill. US $ in 1992 turned into a surplus of US $ 82 bill in 1996
(Statistisches Monatsheft der Oesterreichischen Nationalbank 11/1997).17
This happened recently due to the devaluation of most European currencies vis-à-vis the US-Dollar. As the
events in South-East-Asia have shown, relying on external surpluses however cannot be a stable policy-
strategy on a global scale and cannot be a permanent substitute for internal demand management.
 
-  Monetary policy:
  There are two basic neo-classical propositions which are largely reflected in practical policy statements by
(European) central-banks:
-  Central banks have only direct influence on short-run nominalinterest rates. Long-run real interest
rates can only be influenced in an indirect way by lowering inflationary expectations.
-  Real investment decisions are based on long-run interest rates. Central-banks thus have no direct
influence (and responsibility) with regard to the real sector of the economy. This view is e.g.
reflected in the provisions of the European Central Bank where price-stability is stipulated as the sole
policy objective.
 
  Although widely accepted in the field of practical monetary policy this neo-classical position is not
undisputed in economic theory discussions. In this paper I would like to refer to a systematic, empirically
tested counter-position in the tradition of " Keynesian" aggregate demand analysis
2. The main points of this
position can be summarised in the following way:
 
-  The largest part of financial liabilities of the enterprise sector of an economy consists of bank-credits with
variable (!) interest rates
3. These interest rates (e.g. the "prime rate") show much larger variations as
compared to the typical long-run interest-rate on government bonds. Via the refinancing costs of the
banking sector these enterprise-related interest rates are directly linked with central-bank monetary policy.
 
  As can be seen from Figures 2 and 3 there is a strong - although not always direct - connection between
short-run and long-run
4 interest rates. Comparing German and US data the dramatic extent of the German
"interest-rate shock" of 1990 also becomes visible, as well as the generally more stable trend of US
monetary policy.
 
-  Variations of the variable "prime rate" not only influence the costs of new investments but have a direct
effect on the total financing costs of the accumulated (credit-financed) debt of the enterprise sector. Total
financing costs are thus subject to the effects of an "interest-rate accelerator". If, for instance, all financial
liabilities of an enterprise consist of bank credits with flexible interest rates, an increase in the interest rate
from 5% to 6.5% means an increase in interest payments of 30%. This means that a larger share of the
                                                       
 
2 These reflections are largely based on several studies by the Austrian economist Stephan Schulmeister (1996).
 
3 In Germany (and Japan) about 85% of total financial liabilities of the enterprise sector consist of bank-credits
and "other liabilities" (trade obligations), in the US this percentage is about 70% (Schulmeister, 1996, p. 46).
Although the role of capital market - financing and increased profit shares have recently reduced the role of
bank credits in financing the enterprise sector, bank credits still remains by far the most important form of
external financing in Germany.
 
4 For long-run interest rates long-run treasury bill rates are used. For direct use of "prime-rates" see S.
Schulmeister (1996).18
operating surplus will have to be used for interest payments, resulting in a profit squeeze of the enterprise
sector of the economy.
 
-  Enterprises cannot react immediately to changes in their cost - and financing - structures. Empirically after
about two years higher interest rates will result in lower investment and employment. In a following
recession the flow-of-funds deficit of the enterprise-sector would decline (due to lower investments). As has
been shown before automatic stabiliser effects, ceteris paribus, will lead to increasing budgetary deficits
5.
Again an increase in interest rates has to be seen not as the result but as the cause of public deficits.
 
-  Eventually the recession would also induce monetary authorities to follow a more expansionary policy
which would be reflected in lower interest rates. With strong fluctuations in credit interest rates the rate of
return on real investment, however becomes more  uncertain, causing increasing risk-premiums and in
general leading to higher attractiveness of financial investments as compared to real investments. Thus also
in a climate of low credit-interest rates and - due to the credit accelerator - fast rising profits, it may take
quite a long time for a substantial increase in private investments to occur.
 
-  For a medium and long term perspective the dynamic budget constraints for stabilising the debt/income
relationship are essential. Here the relationship between interest rates and rates of GNP-growth has a
decisive effect. If the rate of interest lies above the rate of growth, enterprises - as well as the government-
sector - will have to run primary surpluses for stabilising their debt/income-relationship. Their net-deficits
(net debt-increase) have to be smaller than the amount of interest payments on the total debt (Blanchard et
al, 1990).
 
  One of the most important reasons for the slow economic growth of the last decade can be seen in the structural
changes with regard to the interest-growth-differential. This interest-growth-differential was negative in the
50s and 60s and has been positive since the late 70s. Although in the 90s in particular there was a sharp rise in
profits, this did not lead to an increase in real investments. Enterprises rather used this for a reduction in their
net-borrowing. The changing interest-growth differential also made financial investments more attractive,
resulting in a fast growth of the financial assets of the "non-financial business-sector of the economy. All this
contributed to the substantial (and continuing!) reduction in enterprise net-lending as is demonstrated for
Germany in Table 1. As has been discussed above, this "automatically" had to be balanced by higher net-
lending shares of the public sector.
 
  In the context of the preparation for EMU over the last number of years a substantial harmonisation - both of
short-run and long-run European interest rates has been observed. Combined with the lowering of interest-rates
which mainly reflects the effects of Europe's severe recession, this tendency may offer the opportunity that an
EMU-regime of monetary policy may be able to reach a more favourable interest growth-differential. In
general, a large relatively closed economy (such as the US or the EMU), where exchange-rates are of no major
policy-concern, offers better chances for growth-oriented monetary policy as compared to small open
                                                       
 
5 This, of course, also works the other way round as can be observed at present in the USA.19
economies. Also the deflationary tendencies connected with the recent Asian crises in this context may be a
blessing-in-disguise, as it will allow the future ECB to engage in a policy of low interest-rates without risking
"reputation-dangers" for the new European currency.
 
  These monetary policy perspectives are in agreement with proposals, for instance by W. Filc (1998), to take
interest rates as the relevant (intermediate) policy target of a future European monetary policy. Technically this
refers to short-run interest rates, which according to Filc (1998, p. 32) should only be slightly above the rate of
inflation. As has been discussed above international experience demonstrates that such a policy has positive
effects on economic growth without risking inflation. Obviously a policy of lower interest rates can and will be
no cure for all aspects of low European growth-rates. But interest-rate policy is indeed a very powerful tool
because it effects four strategic fields of economic policy. Thus lower interest rates would help with regard to
the following:
-  higher real capital investment,
-  preventing an overvaluation of the Euro,
-  lowering public expenditure on interest payments and thus leading to a reduction of public net-lending
without negative demand - and thus labour- market effects,
-  lower macroeconomic (employment) costs of securing price-stability. Higher degrees of capacity-utilisation
and the lower direct cost effects of interest payments mean decreasing average costs in production. Given
the competition-effects of the Single European market this will be translated directly into lower price-
increases. It has to be added that this perspective has to be complemented by a stability (i.e. productivity-)
oriented wage policy on the macroeconomic level, as will be discussed later.
 
 
  3. Economic Growth and Employment
 
  3.1 General View
 
  A basic proposition of this paper is, that there is a strong connection between the dynamics of
employment/unemployment and macroeconomic growth. In addition to Figure 1 this is also demonstrated in
Table 2. This basic connection is however modified by a large number of additional macroeconomic as well as
structural factors. In the context of this paper only some macroeconomic aspects will be looked at.
 
  As can be seen from Table 2 there are very few European countries which have managed to retain a relatively
low rate of unemployment or even reduce it. Countries, where one can observe a very strong and pronounced
link between economic growth and unemployment dynamics are - on the positive side - Norway, Ireland,
Portugal and - to a certain extent - Great Britain. Examples for substantial increases in unemployment
combined with low rates of growth of GDP are for instance Italy and Sweden. There are however also
countries, where this relationship between economic growth and unemployment is modified by a higher
"employment intensity" of economic growth rates. This does not only refer to the well-known example of the
US, but for instance also to the Netherlands, Denmark and to a certain extent also Austria. It is therefore of20
interest to discuss these "special cases". A first explanation may refer to the specific role of supply - side
measures on the labour-markets in each of these countries. In the Netherlands this took the form of a vast
increase in part-time work, in Denmark a reduction of labour-supply was achieved by the introduction of




  3.2. Wage Shares, Wage Flexibility and Employment
 
 
  In addition also to the general picture given above a specific marcroeconomic aspect may be of interest. This
refers to the connection between wage flexibility and employment - a connection which is central to proposals
from the side of the OECD (1994) and the EU. The relevant question here are the macroeconomic aspects of
wage flexibility - not the structural effects of wage policy, e.g. with respect to wage differentials. To reduce
unemployment economists recommend (real) wage increases that are below the increase of labour-productivity.
This would induce forms of technological substitution between capital and labour, thus directly creating
increased labour demand. Indirectly lower rates of labour-productivity-growth would increase the
"employment-intensity" of economic growth.
 
  This kind of policy has in fact been followed in Germany and also in Austria, as can be seen from the declining
wage-shares of GNP (Figure 3). But although there is a permanent tendency of declining wage-shares since the
1980s this has not prevented a substantial rise in unemployment. Rather the decline in the growth of real wages
has led to an increase in the profit share of GNP. A macroeconomic policy of restricted wage-increases thus has
not inducedhigher demand for labour, nor has it resulted in higher real investments (at least not in Germany or
Austria). This development has, of course, to be seen in connection with the tendency of rising interest-rates
discussed above. This tendency contributed to a shift from real to financial investments. The structural effects
of the opening of Eastern Europe, globalisation, etc. also have to be taken into account.
 
  It is of interest to compare these developments with the experience of the USA. Compared with Germany and
Austria the US wage share is not only higher but also much more stable. As there also have been substantial
decreases in the rate of growth of real wages (especially!) in the US, the constant wage-share means that in this
case wage-restriction has in fact led to an increase in employment and also to a decrease in the rate of growth
of labour-productivity.
 
  There are many factors to explain this phenomenon (comp. e.g. R.B. Freeman, 1997, H. Walther, 1997). One
institutional aspect will be discussed in the next section of this paper. Other factors may be insider-outsider
effects, different qualification structures etc,. In this paragraph one factor of special macroeconomic interest
will be discussed. This is the aspect of macroeconomic flexibility of real wages.
 21
  Table 3 gives an overview of estimations for the direct impact of unemployment on wage increases and of the
long-run elasticity of real wages
6. It can be seen that both indicators show substantially higher values for
Germany and most European countries than compared to the US - with Austria showing by far the most
flexible wage-policy. When seen in a macroeconomic context this result may give rise to several interesting
considerations: In periods of low growth there is no clear and direct connection between macroeconomic wage
flexibility and employment performance. For small open economies such as Austria and the Netherlands
downward wage flexibility may serve as a way to devaluing the real exchange rate - as long as this is not
neutralised by exchange-rate effects of rising interest-rates. For the whole EU such a policy would only result in
beggar-my-neighbour-effects.
 
  There is, also, however an interesting second aspect with regard to international differences in wage-flexibility.
This aspect refers to the reaction of wage increases in periods of an economic upswing. A high "upward
mobility" of wages means that inflationary pressures and "preemtive measures" by central banks will occur at a
much earlier stage of an economic upswing, thus contributing to a higher "structural" base of unemployment.
This may (partially) explain the different attitudes especially of the US and the German central bank.
7
 
  The present US discussion about "New Age-Economics" is basically about the question as to whether the
observable low "inflation propensity" of the present strong US economy is only a matter of delays or indicates a
new structural phenomenon. Analytically this means that "old", well-established (short-run) Phillips-curve
relationships, on which central-bank policies were oriented
8, may have changed.
9 This proposition has to be
seen however against the background of the already relatively low extent of US macroeconomic wage-
flexibility, as demonstrated in Table 3. From a policy point of view a tendency of decreasing "upward" wage
flexibility in Europe, too, would allow the European Central Bank to engage in a more expansionary policy as
compared towards former national central banks. Such a tendency can in fact be expected by larger and thus in
real terms more flexible European markets for labour and products.
 
 
  3.3 Productivity and the Service Sector
 
 
  As has been indicated above there are a number of structural aspects connecting macroeconomic growth, labour
productivity and employment. In this section one institutional aspect will be studied which is of special
importance for explaining the fact why high wage flexibility has so little employment effects in Europe. This
refers to the role of the service sector in an economy. In contrast to the industrial sector the service sector may
be characterised by a substantially higher wage-elasticity of labour demand. The small employment-effect of
                                                       
 
6 The parameters in Table 3 are obtained from the QUEST II-Model of the EU-Commission. See also Institut
für Höhere Studien (1998).
 
7 According to H. Walther (1997, p. 125) in Germany in the period of 1961-1965 already an employment
increase of more than 0.5% led to an increase of real per-unit labour costs in the next year. For the US this
employment increase had to be 2%.
 
8See e.g. A.S. Blinder (1997, p. 39).
 
9 For a critical discussion of the "Nirvana perspective" see A.S. Lown, R.W. Rich (1997).22
wage flexibility, especially in Germany and Austria, has thus to be seen in connection with the share of the
service sector in these countries - as compared to the US, the Netherlands and the UK (compare Table 4). To a
large extent this reflects differences in economic structures (compare e.g. the different employment shares of
finance and business services!). To a certain extent these differences however indicate different institutional
policy options - with very direct employment effects.
 
  In the US, community, social and personal services (such as e.g. education and health care) are organised in a
private or semi-private way, whereas in European welfare states, such as in Germany and Austria, they are
provided by different levels of government. The way of provision has different allocative and distributive effects
which will not be discussed here. It is however obvious, that these kinds of services are subject to increasing
demand and - due to their low productivity - show a large growth potential for employment. The realisation of
this services-related growth potential contributed in a big way to the positive US employment performance. For
the European welfare-states however this growth potential could not be realised due to institutional - political
rigidities. As these services - to a large extent with good distributional reasons - are publicly financed in Europe
an expansion of this sector and thus of public expenditure would lead to higher shares in public revenues. In
fact, however, in most European countries the share of real public expenditure declined due to budgetary
restrictions. The alternative to public provision would be to allow for private suppliers of relevant social
services. Many European countries have however chosen a third way with negative employment effects: For
political reasons no private supply of these services was allowed, but on the other hand it proved also politically
not possible to provide public financing for an expansion of these services. Being unable to take one of these
options meant the loss of vast opportunities for economic growth and for new employment.
 
 
  4. The Austrian Experience - Macroeconomic Perspectives
 
 
  In the final section of this paper Austria will be brievy discussed as a case-study of a small open economy that
has managed to keep unemployment-rates remarkably low for a long period of time (see Table 5). With the
exception of the last few years employment figures have also been more dynamic when compared to the rest of
Europe, participation rates are relatively high and rising.
10 A major cause for the differences between
European, particularly also the German labour-market performance and the results for Austria can be seen in
structural differences (e.g. the higher employment share of the service-sector in comparison with Germany).
Such structural differences both on the supply and the demand side of labour markets are also to be observed
among the different regions of large countries. These kinds of differences may be the prime explanation for the
large - and rather stable - regional variation of unemployment rates for instance in Germany.
 
  Considering the case of Austria it can be expected however that macroeconomic factors are also of relevance
for the explanation of differences in labour market dynamics. Without attempting a general analyses
11 special
                                                       
 
10 Participation rates (labour force as percentage of total population between 15-65 years) 1995; Austria 59.4%,
Germany 57.7%, EU 15 55.2%.
 
11 For more general discussions see e.g. E. Walterskirchen (1997), E. Nowotny (1997).23
attention will be given to the connection between cyclical volatility of unemployment and the levels of
unemployment because in this respect Austria is indeed a special case in Europe.
 
  For a number of theoretical reasons (e.g. when assuming a non-linear short run Phillips-Curve) it can be
expected that a lower cyclical volatility of unemployment ceteris paribus will be connected with lower levels of
unemployment. In a comparison of various European small open economies (Table 6) for the period 1970-1996
Austria in fact shows the lowest average rate of unemployment and by far the lowest variability of
unemployment rates.
 
  It has to be noted that the differences in the variability of unemployment rates are much more pronounced than
the differences in output-variability. The lower cyclical volatility of unemployment in Austria thus cannot be
explained by lower cyclical variations of GNP. At first sight this is in contradiction to the position stressed in
section 1 of this paper, that unemployment dynamics basically is determined by the dynamics of GNP-growth.
It has to be noted however that one has to distinguish between the basic connection between GNP-growth and
employment/unemployment and the modifications of this basic connection due to structural and policy
influences. This can be seen in more detail looking at the reaction of employment to output deviations from the
trend. and the reaction of labour supply to employment deviation from the trend. In the first case Austria shows
much lower, in the second case Austria shows much higher values than compared to the other countries,
analysed in Table 5.
 
  Lower cyclical reactions of employment to output changes, i.e. procyclical variations of labour-productivity
could be the indicator of "labour hoarding" in periods of cyclical downswings and of anticyclical government
employment policies (promoting part-time work, employment projects, etc.). In fact in Austria these kinds of
strategy played a substantial role in the 70s , using e.g. the (then) nationalised industries and public investment
programmes as instruments of employment policy (E. Nowotny, 1982). There have also been however
additional factors of cyclical employment stabilisation, such as the higher flexibility of real wages discussed in
section 3.2 and the effects of a larger service sector of the economy.
 
  Unemployment dynamics is also affected by the reaction of labour supply to changes in labour market
conditions. Procyclical changes in labour supply have a dampening effect on cyclical variations of the rate of
unemployment. The strong labour supply elasticity in Austria is due to procyclical reactions concerning labour-
immigration (also in Switzerland), but is also due to policy-induced effects concerning the retirement age and
female work-force participation (e.g. by creating opportunities for additional maternity-leave). It has to be
noted however that participation rates are relatively high in Austria, which indicates that the main long-run
effect of these measures was not a permanent reduction in the labour-supply but rather substitutions-effects for
instance in favour of youth employment.
 
  It is of special interest to observe that in all countries shown in Table 5 there has been a dramatic change
between reactions in the 70s and in the 80s and 90s. For 1984-1996 coefficients close to 1 indicate that now24
variations of output almost directly translate into cyclical reactions in employment. Next to Sweden
12 Austria
exhibits the most dramatic change in employment reactions. This can be interpreted as indicating the end of a
specific "Austrian way" of "active" employment policy. This development was brought about by several factors:
One was the negative effects of the European steel-crisis on Austria's nationalised industry, leading to (partial)
privatisation and intensive restructuring. In a more general way due to increasing debt-ratios and - later - in the
process of preparation for EMU-membership public net deficits were reduced rapidly
13. This did not only
weaken general demand but it also had an immediate negative effect on the important role of the public sector
as the "direct employer of last resort"
14.
 
  Even if there has been a structural change in Austria's labour-markets, unemployment in the country in recent
periods has also been much lower and has been increasing more slowly when compared to other European
countries. There has been some increase in the form of "passive" labour market policy (increased rates of early
retirement, etc.), but there are two main factors which are also of general relevance:
 
-  The active macroeconomic and structural policies of fighting unemployment already at an early stage of
employment problems prevented a high level of "structural unemployment" (and especially long-term
"hysteresis"-unemployment). Of course a small open economy is not able to isolate itself permanently from
rising European (and for Austria particulary German) unemployment. But it pays "to fight as long as you
can". As can be seen from Figure 1 since the 1980s the development of unemployment in Austria closely
followed the European pattern - but as can be seen from Table 5 at a much lower level. This means that the
specifically employment-oriented active macroeconomic fiscal policy of the 70s could not be followed
permanently - but the positive results of this policy did not get lost in later periods. Macroeconomic policies
to prevent large economic fluctuations and a rocketing of unemployment in recessions not only have short-
run but also positive long-run effects.
-  Such an employment-oriented macroeconomic policy has to be based on a close co-operation between fiscal,
monetary and incomes policy. This was - and largely still is - the case in Austria. The system of "Social-
Partnership" leads to the relatively high real wages flexibility, discussed in section 3. By taking care of
aspects of "distributional fairness" the system of "Social-Partnership" also enables a stability oriented fiscal
policy without social turmoil. The role of monetary policy is restricted due to the strategy of following a
"hard currency" policy of a fixed exchange rate with the DM. But within this context the Austrian Central
Bank tries to support an employment-oriented policy by the government and the social-partners. This co-
ordination is helped by the fact that the social partners (trade unions and associations of industry, commerce
and agriculture) are also (minority) share holders of the Austrian Central Bank and are directly represented
in its decision-making body.
15 The experience of Austria thus underlines the benefits of policy co-ordination
and the importance of the integration of monetary policy into such a system of policy co-ordination.
                                                       
 
12 The coeeficient of higher than 1 in Sweden can be seen as indicating the "explosion" of an "employment
bubble".
 
13 Between 1995 and 1998 total public sector net deficits (as % of GDP) were reduced from 5,1% to 2,7%.
 
14 From 1987-1996 employment in Austria increased for 210 000 persons, 140 000 of which were added to the
public sector workforce (including health and education).
15 This latter provision had to be changed in the course of Austria's preparations for EMU-membership.25
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Table 1
Sectoral Financial Balances
Net surplus/net deficit in % of GDP
1973 1975 1992 1994 1995 1996 1997
Germany
Private housholds 7,9 9,4 7,0 7,6 7,5 7,6 7,5
Enterprise sector -7,8 -2,7 -4,0 -6,2 -4,9 -4,4 -4,4
Public sector 1,2 -5,7 -2,3 -2,4 -3,6 -3,8 -3,2
External balance
1)
-1,3 -1,0 -0,7 1,0 1,0 0,6 0,1
Austria
Private households 4,7 6,2 7,9 6,3 6,4 5,4 4,9
Enterprise sector -6,3 -3,8 -5,9 -2,5 -3,2 -3,6 -4,2
Public sector 1,3 -2,5 -2,0 -4,8 -4,9 -3,8 -2,6
External balance
1)
0,3 0,1 0,1 0,9 1,8 2,1 1,8
1)External balance: Current account with reversed sign.
Source: E. Nowotny (1996, p. 602), Österr. Institut f. Wirtschaftsforschung, Germany 1996/97:
Gemeinschaftsgutachten der Wirtschaftsforschungsinstitute31
Table 2
Unemployment Rates and Economic Growth
1979-97 1990-97














Australia 2,6 2,9 1,7 2,6 8,7
Austria 4,4 2,1 1,4 1,7 6,1
Belgium 5,1 1,7 3,9 1,2 12,7
Canada 1,7 2,3 1,0 1,6 9,2
Switzerland 5,0 1,4 4,8 0,0 5,3
Germany 8,2 2,4 5,2 2,7 11,4
Denmark 1,7 1,9 -1,7 2,2 7,9
Spain 13,0 2,3 5,3 1,5 21,0
Finland 8,6 2,2 11,1 0,6 14,6
France 6,6 1,8 3,5 1,2 12,4
Great Britain 2,4 1,9 1,0 1,5 6,9
Greece 8,6 1,5 3,5 1,4 10,5
Ireland 3,4 4,2 -2,6 4,9 10,3
Island 3,4 2,4 2,0 1,7 3,8
Italy 6,6 1,8 3,2 1,0 12,3
Japan 1,3 2,8 1,3 1,4 3,4
Korea -1,3 7,2 0,1 6,3 2,5
Luxembourg 3,0 4,2 2,4 4,2 3,7
Mexico -0,6 2,4 1,4 2,4 4,1
Netherlands 2,2 2,1 -0,2 2,1 5,8
Norway 2,0 3,0 -1,3 3,4 3,9
New Zealand 4,9 2,1 -1,1 1,9 6,7
Portugal -1,4 2,5 2,1 1,7 6,8
Sweden 6,0 1,4 6,5 0,7 8,1
Turkey -2,6 4,1 -1,9 3,7 6,1
USA -0,8 2,3 -0,6 2,0 5,0
1 In percentage points
2Average annual growth rate of real GDP
Source: OECD Main Economic Indicators32
Table 3
Impact of Unemployment on Wage Increases

















Source: Roeger, W., in't Veld, J. (1997)33
Table 4
Role and Structure of the Service Sector, 1994
(Contribution to Employment in % of Total Employment)




Germany 59,1 15,9 n.a.
Austria 63,2 21,8 5,5
Netherlands 70,4 12,7 17,1
France 69,7 28,0 7,2
Sweden 69,9 32,0 8,2
U.K. 70,2 19,4 11,8
U.S. 73,1 14,5 17,5
Source, OECD in Figures, Paris 199734
Table 5
Austria: Economic Growth, Employment
and Unemployment




Austria 3,4 2,3 2,1 2,1
OECD-Europe 3,0 2,5 1,8 2,7
Employment
1)
Austria 0,7 0,2 0,6 0,1
OECD-Europe 0,5 0,7 -0,3 0,7
Unemployment
2)




OECD-Europe 4,0 8,2 9,4 6,1







Cyclical Volatility of Employment and Unemployment
A Dk Nl S CH
Average rate of unemployment
1970-1996
4,90 7,70 7,70 4,30 1,50
Variability of unemploment-
rates 1979-1996
0,35 1,10 1,02 0,84 0,47
Variability of output
1
1,79 1,92 1,55 1,73 2,57
Employment-reaction
2
1979-1996 0,47 0,62 0,52 0,77 0,67
1979-1983 0,33 0,81 0,49 0,40 0,70
1984-1996 0,87 1,20 1,00 1,40 0,93
Labour-supply reaction
3
1979-1996 0,83 0,26 0,12 0,51 0,85
1979-1983 0,55 0,25 0,03 0,49 0,94
1984-1996 0.93 0,26 0,20 0,51 0,66
1 Standarddeviation of first differences
2 Coefficient b in a regression  connecting 'employment deviation from trend' and 'output deviation from trend'
3 Coefficient b in a regression connecting 'labour supply deviation from trend' and 'employment deviation from trend'
Source: IHS (1998, p. 32)